INTRODUCTION
Located in the "heart of South America" between two hegemonic rivals, Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay is one of only two landlocked countries in Latin America. This mediterraneanMediterranean location has been the lynchpin of economic policy and international relations in Paraguay for almost a century (Birch, 1992) . In fact, Paraguayan foreign policy rests on three pillars: a commitment to the sanctity of borders and the principal of non-intervention,; free navigation of the rivers that form its border on three sides; and, since 1989, the defense of democracy and human rights (Rachid & Ramirez, 2008) . Thus, the decision to join the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) in 1991 represented a remarkable shift in Paraguayan foreign policy that would entail not so much bringing down barriers to trade, investment, and migration but building cooperation and coordination in areas of national economic strategy, macroeconomic policy and international relations. with import-substitution industrialization only briefly in the 1960s, swung toward export promotion for a similarly brief period and then proceeded to become the Southern Cone's source for imported products from extra-regional markets due to low tariffs and a stable exchange rate (Arce, 2010; Baer & Birch, 1987) . Long known for a thriving border trade in towns close to Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay consistently built on its position as a landlocked buffer state to garner economic benefits from neighboring countries and, during the Cold War, a staunchly anti-Communist stance to reap aid from the United States. In more recent years, the Paraguayan economy has been characterized by long periods of stagnation, punctuated by booms and busts often connected to climatic conditions (Borda, 2011 ).
Paraguay did not accumulate much debt to finance its growth in the 1970s and, as a result, largely escaped the debt crisis of the 1980s. Instead, Paraguay experienced rapid growth in the 1970s during the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric facility and as its continuing drive to the East paid off with an expanding agricultural frontier at a time of relatively high commodity prices (Baer & Birch, 1994; Birch, 1992) . However, when construction stopped and prices fell, the economy entered into a period of prolonged stagnation (Baer & Birch, 1984; Quiroga, 2007) . Droughts and floods conspired with global fluctuations in commodity prices to make sustained growth elusive (Table 1) . After growing by nearly 6 percent on average during the 1970s, Paraguay entered into a period of slower and more variable growth in the 1980s that lasted for nearly two decades and from which it has only recently begun to recover (Birch, 2005; Borda, 2011) (Table 2 ). Stroessner. In the space of three years, between 1989 and 1991, Paraguay experienced three events that dramatically changed the political and economic environment of the country: the end of the Stroessner dictatorship, the end of the Cold War, and the introduction of new regional trading arrangements with the advent of Mercosur. The Colorado Party, however, continued in power and during the first decade of transition to democracy, much weaker governments tried with varying degrees of success to make economic policy in this new and more difficult political and economic context. (Birch, 1993) . It was not until 2008, after sixtyone years of Colorado party rule, that power would pass peacefully for the first time in Paraguay's history to an opposition candidate, Fernando Lugo. . (Brun, 2011) .
= Insert
Unlike Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay had not experienced high inflation, a large state sector, or a protected domestic market in the years prior to 1991. Paraguay's tariffs were lower than the Mercosur average and the exchange rate had been stable, even if unrealistic, for long periods under the Stroessner regime. With the transition to democracy in Paraguay, Mercosur became an immediate political issue. The economic policy orientation of the first two democratic administrations fit well with the prevailing economic wisdom coming from Washington in the 1980s: free trade and less government intervention in the economy. It also represented policy continuity amidst so much political change. Both presidents would make modest, incremental changes to Paraguayan economic policy, but membership in Mercosur represented a fundamental change in development strategy and regional economic relations.
Field Code Changed
A partnership of democratic governments, Paraguay had not been eligible for membership during the Stroessner regime, but it had been watching on the sidelines as the former rivals, Argentina and Brazil, forged stronger economic ties under the Act of Argentine-Brazilian Integration (1986) , the Treaty for Integration, Cooperation & Development (1988) , and the Act of Buenos Aires (1990) which established that the countries would create a common market in four years (Birch, 2000) . With democratic elections completed in Paraguay shortly after the coup, the opportunity to join the regional integration project became real. However, since much of Paraguayan economic policy was based on playing Argentina and Brazil against each other, Mercosur would require a major rethinking of economic strategy (World Bank, 1992; Birch, 1992) .
Campesinos, workers and unions generally opposed Mercosur, but they were a small and fractured group. The business community was divided on the merits of joining Mercosur.
Manufacturing was a small portion of the Paraguayan economy, about 15 percent, so despite the potential threat of imports from Mercosur countries, manufacturers were not a powerful opposition. Another, more politically well-connected, part of the private sector, however, would theoretically face extinction if Paraguay joined Mercosur. This was the prosperous group of merchants that made their living selling US, European and Asian imports to tourists from neighboring Argentina and Brazil where taxes and regulation, part of the importsubstitution development strategy pursued by these countries for decades, made it hard to acquire such products. In addition to low tariffs and a generally free trade stance, Paraguay's Paraguay's Ministry of Foreign Relations urged the government to devise a new, proactive strategy to defend the nation's interests in the upcoming Mercosur negotiations but found little interest in other parts of government. (Rachid, 2008) Mercosur would bring to an end the effectiveness of the pendulum politics strategy that had been used so effectively for more than 50 years and required the identification of a new approach (Birch, 1992) . The apparent apathy on the part of government officials likely reflected less a commitment to laissez faire than an incapacity to design and implement a set of policies that would encourage private sector competitiveness in this new context, one characterized by preferential market access to large, neighboring countries but more limited ties to extra-regional markets.
Suffering from economic stagnation, a fragile democratic transition, and without the tradition of proactive development management, Paraguay seems to have been incapable of designing a constructive policy response to Mercosur that would have fostered the development of a modern industrial sector. (Rodríguez, 2001) . Instead, Paraguay regarded joining Mercosur as the lesser of two evils since the advantages offered by greater market access were thought insufficient to compensate for the social dislocation and likely end to certain commercial activities that regional integration represented. Still, being excluded from the neighboring markets as they grew stronger through integration was not attractive either.
As a result, Paraguay took few domestic policy measures to enable firms or individuals to respond proactively to Mercosur, instead acting defensively to negotiate longer lists of exceptions and longer phase-in periods for the Common External Tariff (CET). The implications of this approach will be discussed below. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MERCOSUR
When the Treaty of Asuncion was signed, it was hoped that Paraguay's comparative advantage in terms of cheaper land and labor might lead to its integration into the supply chain of major industrial sectors in Argentina and Brazil fostering the formation of globally competitive clusters located in the Southern Cone that served the world market. Industries as diverse as automobiles and processed meat were often mentioned. Given the scale and landlocked location of Paraguayan producers, many believed their best chance for reaching global markets competitively lay in becoming part of the production process of larger Argentine or Brazilian industries that were already selling both to domestic and global customers. Were this to happen, Paraguay's pattern of production and trade would shift, investment would rise and incomes would grow, providing a higher standard of living for Paraguayans. In this section, the data on the economy, income, investment and trade will be examined.
Impact on Income
The overarching reason for joining Mercosur was the hope that Paraguay's membership would bring average per capita income in Paraguay closer to that in the other three countries.
At the time Paraguay joined Mercosur, its per capita income ($1435 in 1991) 2 was the lowest among the Mercosur countries and about one quarter of the per capita income of Mercosur's richest member at the time, Argentina (World Bank, 2012). The literature on convergence (Barro, Sala-I-Martin, Blanchard, & Hall, 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1996a) , even within an RTA (Quiroga, 2007; Sala-i-Martin, 1996b) , is not very encouraging and Paraguay's experience confirms that perspective. As can be seen in Table 3a, 
On Economic Structure
One might argue that the impact of Mercosur would be seen first on the structure of the economy as winners and losers sorted themselves out in the new economic context. Here the data are more consistent with expectations. Paraguayan manufacturing has declined as a share of total economic activity (Table 4) . Over the course of successive democratic regimes, there is a continuous shift toward agriculture and basic services and away from manufacturing and commerce. Brazil's devaluation in 1999 and Argentina's frequent application of surcharges and ultimate resort to import restrictions may have overwhelmed the potential benefits of lower tariffs on Paraguayan exports into these major markets.
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Somewhat unexpectedly, Paraguay is a more agricultural economy today than it was in 1990. 3 Hiding behind this aggregate data is a marked shift away from small-scale production of a variety of agricultural crops for both domestic consumption and export and toward largescale, mechanized production of soybeans for global commodity markets. Between 1999 and 3 Agriculture as a share of GDP is also greater today than it was during the 20 years prior to the democratic transition. Agriculture as a share of GDP for the period 1968-88 averaged 14.2 percent, while it stood at 18.4 percent for the period 2003-10. (Borda, 2012) . Unfortunately, the data do not demonstrate such an effect (Table 5) facility. Paraguayan maquila operations can be located in any part of the country and in any industry. Food, motorcycles, plastics, and apparel are being manufactured for export under the maquila law, which took effect in 2000. To date some 50 companies have undertaken operations under this legal umbrella, many adding value to operations in Brazil. (Masi, 2011) This may be an early sign of developing supply chain relationships but if so, the impact is slow to emerge and still slight. On International Trade 5. Masi notes an increase in FDI entering Paraguay (as a share of GDP) in the 1990s which he attributes to the restructuring of the banking and financial services sector responding more to inter nal issues resulting from the transition to democracy than growing regional integration.
The most immediate and marked effect of Mercosur on Paraguay might be expected in its international trade. After the Treaty of Asuncion, exports to Mercosur partners did indeed grow more rapidly than exports to the rest of the world (Table 6a ). As a share of all exports, those to Mercosur exceed exports to the rest of the world beginning in 1996 (Table 8a) , some five years after the Treaty of Asuncion was signed. As might be expected, the impact of Mercosur varied across products. Regression analysis revealed that membership in Mercosur was associated with increasing exports of chemicals, vegetable oil and beef but had a negative association with cotton and little impact on apparel and soybeans. 6 Paraguayan imports from Mercosur also grew faster after the Treaty of Asuncion (Table 7a ) and as a share of all imports, those from Mercosur exceed those from the rest of the world beginning in 1996 (Table 8b) In the 1990s, the new democratic Paraguayan government, facing increasing pressure from other governments, tried to gain better control over border commerce. The "regimen de turismo" was included as part of a broader tax reform, institutionalizing the process of reexports. Products sold legally under the regimen de turismo were eligible for a reduced tariff rate and a lower value added tax, an incentive to regularize this border trade. Electronics, toys, designer clothing, and athletic shoes were among the most frequently commercialized products under this arrangement .8
Mercosur and its CET posed a significant challenge to this business in the border regions. Fortunately, as one of the disadvantaged members of Mercosur, Paraguay was permitted an ample list of products to be excluded from the CET. Instead of putting capital goods on this list to spur manufacturing, the products covered by the regimen de turismo were included in the list of exceptions and the re-export activity was preserved. In fact, by the end of the 1990s, export sales under the regimen de turismo were estimated to be three times the value of exported domestic products (Masi, 2012, p.19 (Penner, 2006) .
In an attempt to gain some control over this trade, Brazil's Lei dos Sacoleiros, which took effect in January 2012 (Martello, 2012) permits small business people to import extraregional merchandise into Brazil up to $110,000 reais (about $63,000) annually, paying a single tax rate of 25 percent instead of the usual 50 percent (Martello, 2009 ). Many products (arms, cigarettes, medicine, and liquor, for example) are exempt from the law, suggesting that electronics is the target of this legislation. Importers wishing to operate under this new trade facility must be registered firms in Brazil, requiring a substantial investment of time and money to enter the formal market. Early indications are that those barriers were sufficient to deter informal operators from moving into the formal sector (Wurmeister, 2013) .
These features of Paraguayan trade create an enormous challenge to official statistics.
With the dramatic increase in soybean production, and the high proportion of Brazilian participation in that process, it seems likely that much of the trade identified as going to Brazil may well be soybeans destined for global markets rather than local consumption. Similarly, a large proportion of Paraguay's luxury and electronics imports from Asia are not destined for domestic consumption. Instead, they will be sold to the sacoleiros who will see they reach consumers in major urban areas in Brazil. Recently, researchers at CADEP, working with the (Servin, 2010, p. 5) . This adjustment only accounts for soybean trade; additional work will be required to make similar corrections for other commodities such as rice and wheat. Similarly, when adjustments were made for re-export activity, Paraguay's balance of trade deficit in 2010, equal to about 30 percent of its GDP, becomes a 13 percent surplus; Paraguay's official trade deficit with Mercosur partners (equal to 19 percent of GDP using official statistics) becomes a trade surplus of 5 percent of GDP when re-exports are included.
Using the adjusted statistics provided by CADEP that remove soybean exports bound for global markets and include extra-regional merchandise destined for Brazil, a very different picture of trade with Mercosur emerges. Acknowledging that the revised figures are a work in progress, it is possible to see that for certain Paraguayan products, Mercosur partners represent a significant market (Table 9 ). Unlike the official statistics, these results suggest that Mercosur is a market for a mix of agricultural and manufactured exports. Swanson's study of Paraguayan industrial exports (Swanson, 2012) revealed that Mercosur constitutes an important export opportunity for industrial producers. Industrial exports include chilled/frozen beef, vegetable oil, and leather goods but also chemicals, textiles and apparel.
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If one adds the associated members (Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) to the original partners, it is clear that Mercosur is an important avenue for the growth of industrialized exports. According to Swanson (2012) , about 47 percent of exports to associated countries consist of chilled beef exports to Chile. A study of the Paraguayan pharmaceutical industry (Servin, 2010) production. In the past, however, investment, foreign or domestic, has been insufficient to restructure the manufacturing sector to take advantage of opportunities more quickly and on a larger scale. Instead, the growing weight of agriculture in the structure of the economy diverts attention from the opportunity to develop regional clusters.
As a result, there is no evidence of Mercosur leading to higher economic growth in Paraguay and thus little sign of convergence toward a higher level of per capita income for Paraguayans. While brief spurts of growth have lowered poverty rates, unfavorable climatic conditions or falling world commodity prices tend to erase those gains when economic growth falters. On average, over a longer period, the economy has tended to stagnate at a low growth threshold while the absence of investment and economic restructuring has denied the country a more stable, high-growth alternative. Indeed, the Paraguayan economy has become more heavily agricultural with a smaller industrial sector and the investment that has taken place, in labor-saving, mechanized agriculture, and sporadic foreign direct investment in mineral exploration seems to reflect global demand for commodities rather than opportunities derived from Mercosur.
Yet there are some subtle changes that suggest Mercosur's impact may be growing.
While industrial exports are small in absolute terms, more than half of all Paraguayan industrial exports go to Mercosur markets. For producers of pharmaceuticals, plastics and processed foods, consumers in the Mercosur countries are very important. Moreover, Mercosur opens doors to global trading partners. Extra-regional agreements have opened markets for Paraguay that it might have been unable to do alone and these markets are important. Not only do they enable Paraguay to diversify its export partners, they also permit new products to be exported, particularly manufactured goods. This broader exposure to world markets may be expected to contribute to greater competitiveness and a stronger manufacturing sector in the long run.
Finally, there has been important growth in just a couple of products that could bring significant changes to the structure of production and export in Paraguay. Organic sugar, organic and sustainable yerba mate, and stevia are all experiencing a significant increase in global demand, reflecting the growing interest in "lifestyle products" that are part of healthy consumptions patterns in developed countries. This global trend may make extra-regional markets relatively more important to Paraguay over the next 20 years, but unlike soybeans and other commodities that Paraguay now exports to those markets, these organic products involve more labor and smaller scale operations. As a result, they provide income and employment for more people. However, to achieve the scale of production needed for major developed country markets, Paraguayan producers may find that linkages or alliances with Mercosur partners might be more effective than trying to go it alone.
The first 20 years of Mercosur corresponds to a period of significant internal adjustment in Paraguay as the country transitioned to democracy after some 35 years of dictatorship. Perhaps this explains, at least in part, the absence of more marked or fundamental changes in the Paraguayan economy as a result of Mercosur, as well as the absence of appropriate public policies to amplify the opportunities. At the same time, Mercosur itself has moved forward less decisively than originally anticipated. Exchange rates still matter and non-tariff barriers still count. Deepening macroeconomic coordination among member-states will go a long way to making Mercosur a more attractive opportunity for Paraguay. 1970A1 1972A1 1974A1 1976A1 1978A1 1980A1 1982A1 1984A1 1986A1 1988A1 1990A1 1992A1 1994A1 1996A1 1998A1 70% 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1972A1 1974A1 1976A1 1978A1 1980A1 1982A1 1984A1 1986A1 1988A1 1990A1 1992A1 1994A1 1996A1 1998A1 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 Share from Mercosur Share from ROW Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. Figures adjusted for in-transit shipments and re-exports.
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